The question I want to address is this: if I find two books lying side by side on a library table, the first a manuscript diary evidently left by the person who has just vacated my seat, the other a published diary lifted from the shelves, why is my reaction to the idea of reading the first different from my reaction to the second? Why would I hesitate to open even a page of the tattered notebook yet feel no guilt at all about reading every sentence of the published work? Of course others may not share my scruples, may even abandon the reading they intended to spend a happy few hours (secretly) reading the notebook . But whatever their choice, I would guess most people finding themselves in my position would discriminate between their reading of these two books. It is this difference I want to account for.
The starting point for the analysis of my dilemma will be Jean Roussel's tentative thoughts on the position of the reader of diaries outlined in 'Le journal intirne, texte sans destinataire?" Here Rousset constructs a typology of the diary based upon the position of the addressee, the reader to whom the work is addressed. However, while such a typology makes clearer the areas to be discussed, it does not answer my own question. To do so it will be necessary to extend the discussion beyond any personal contract between diarist and reader to the legal contract between publisher and reader. That is, I will want to know, first, how my attitude to a diary is altered by its publication, and, second, what sort of work the diary then becomes.
In 'Le journal intime, texte sans destinataire?' Rousset suggests a typology of diary-writing according to the position of the addressee. Beginning with those diaries addressed solely to the diarist, Rousset identifies points on a scale according to the degree of 'openness' (ouverture),> the degree to which persons other than the diarist are addressed by the text. Simplifying, the points on the scale are as follows: 3/ Diaries addressed to an external addressee who might read the diary 4/ Diaries which the diarist allows to be read by an intimate acquaintance 51J oin t diaries 6 / Diaries addressed and presented to a group of friends 7 / Diaries which the diarist allows to be published, either posthumously or while living
It will be seen from this outline that the typology is not based strictly upon whether or not the diary is directly addressed to a person other than the diarist. Rather, the degree of openness depends upon how many readers the diarist permits. Thus, a diary written for a particular person but which the diarist later allows to be published will, presumably, move up the scale, regardless of the addressee inscribed within the text. This is a little confusing, but does not undermine the logic of the typology.
My main interest in the typology, however, is how it relates to my initial dilemma, the discrepancy of my feelings between the two diaries I find on the library table. In the case of the unpublished notebook, Rousset is very helpful, since my hesitancy would be due to the fact that the work is not addressed to me. Rousset reminds us that diaries were written long before the relatively modern practice of publishing diaries, and a founding principle of the diary is a belief in its own privacy -'Que Ie cahier secret soit interdit de lecture est conforme II son projet initial. ,3 To read such a notebook would be to violate the secrecy clause -'nous lisons, par effraction, des textes autodestinataires . ,4 In its prelapsarian form, the diary is held to be a text closed to all but the diarist, a private communication with oneself.
With the other book, the published diary, Rousset's typology is a little less helpful. Or rather, its basis becomes less relevant. For it is not necessary for me to know whether or not the diarist authorized publication for me to be able to pick up the diary and flick through it without the hesitancy I felt regarding the notebook. The organizing principle behind Rousset's scale, the number of readers the diarist permits, does not here apply. Certainly to know if the diarist had authorized publication might affect the way I read the diary, and if as a critic I were interested in the diarist's motives for keeping a diary, the typology could prove useful. But since published diaries span the entire scale (Rousset's own study being based on published diaries), the situation of the addressee is not such a primary factor as Rousset suggests.
Let me expand this point briefly . Rousset contends that the unauthorized reader is a rule-breaker, breaking into the closed circuit between diarist and addressee . It follows from this that a varying proportion of the diary is likely to be incomprehensible to the reader, the context of the message being absent. To this degree, the question of whether the diary has been written for the diarist alone or for a group of friends may affect the readability of the diary. But this does not in itself prevent a reading of the text for at least two reasons. First, it is likely that an editor has attempted to fill in the gaps and reconstruct an original context. And second, the reader of the diary does not have to accept the position of the addressee, does not have to read the work solely for the information the diarist wishes to convey. A number of reading strategies are available to the modern reader and one which welcomes areas of undecidability, which considers meaning as built upon gaps and misrecognition, may well be equally productive. The situation of the addressee in the diary might affect how the published diary is read, but not whether it can be read .
II
I want now to spend a little more time looking at the differences in terms of the reader between the unpublished and the published diary. One immediate difference between the two diaries confronting me is that one is handwritten and the other in print. The effect of this is to make the notebook appear more personal than the printed diary, less official and more immediate. This effect reinforces my reluctance to open the notebook, a reinforcement of the feeling that the work contains a secret not meant for my eyes. However, this difference between manuscript and print is an additional factor and does not itself derive from Roussel's secrecy clause or from the type of addressee within the text. For, as Yury Lotman points out, the handwritten message appears more private and unofficial only when compared with the printed message -when compared with an oral message, the effect is the reverse, the handwritten message appearing more formal.
5 That is to say, the quality of the message is determined not only by its materiality but by 'its relationship to texts that have an opposing function.' Neither, it should be stressed, is there any greater authenticity in the handwritten text -both diaries, in that they are recognizably diaries, contain the characteristics of previous diaries, and authenticity is an effect of stylistic features already exercised within the genre as a whole. A simulated diary can give the same effect. Moreover, to the extent that, as Roland Barthes would have it, all emotions are copies of emotions read elsewhere, the diary, held to be the most immediate form of writing, is the very opposite -as Barthes puts it, 'to report a mood in the coded language of the Collection of Moods is to copy a copy. , 6 A second effect of publication is to alter the operation of the secrecy clause. Two cases present themselves. Rousset is correct in pointing out the difference between a diary with the diarist as sole addressee and a diary written for publication (though in practice such a distinction is difficult to make without explicit secondary documentation). With the diary written for publication the reader is likely to feel somewhat cheated, as though the text is less honest and the secrets suppressed. The same would be true if the diary has not been written for publication, but has been published as an edited selection. However, in the case of the publication of a complete diary which the diarist did not envisage publishing, though the secrecy clause now operates as in the case of the unpublished notebook, the expectation of secrets revealed is tempered by the knowledge that time has made them less dangerous. The laws of libel ensure that no living person can be hurt.
The third, and perhaps the most consequential, effect of publication is to alter the status of the reader to that of authorized reader. I feel free to pick up the published diary precisely because it has been published. This authorization may derive from the diarist, as in Roussel's final clause, but where this is not so, there is still an authorization by the owners of the copyright. This is a legal authorization contained in a contract with the publisher, and by this contract I am assured that I have a right to read the diary, without fear of being assaulted by an angry diarist. However, there is also another authorization, not so much legal as ritual. For I am guaranteed that I am not the first person other than the addressee to read the diary. In other words, the violation of the secrecy clause has been performed for me by an editor, a person licensed to examine the work prior to its release to the public. The editor thus not only makes the diary more comprehensible to me, but certifies that the work can now be read without scruple.
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III
Before moving on to consider the implications of this for the diary, it is necessary to consider more clearly the basis of the secrecy clause. I have argued above that publication has, either by excision of the manuscript or by the passage of time, altered the functioning of the secrecy clause, and that the certification of this fact by an editor makes the reader of the published diary an authorized reader of the text. The reader can violate the privacy of the diary without guilt. But because the editor is licensed by the copyright holder, authorization of the reader also relies on a legal contract. And this legal contract raises the possibility that the secrecy clause derives not only from the diarist's ethical right to self-privacy, but also from the diarist's legal rights to private property. It is likely I would hand in the manuscript diary as lost property, but leave the published diary where I found it if it were clearly marked as property of the library.
To consider the notions of privacy and property as they apply to an authorization of the reader, let me take first the case of a diary published during the writer's lifetime. Rousset contends that such a diary has become a 'work' -'il rejoint la condition normale de tout ecrit publie par son auteur. ,8 I wiII consider this aspect more fully in my next section. But if we can accept this as so, it still leaves Rousset with a question: 'est-il un texte comme un autre? au garde-t-illa trace de son statut initial d'ecrit pour soi seul et promis au secret?'· In terms of its privacy, the secrecy clause remains an active factor where the diarist is still living, since personal secrets are only active in so far as they could have an effect on other dimensions of the diarist's life if revealed . For this reason, it is likely that personal secrets would be edited out of a diary published during the lifetime of the diarist. Unless the diarist wishes to become infamous, any secrets remaining will no longer be active due to the passage of time. Here would reside any trace that remained of the secrecy clause.
In terms of property rights, it is clear that once a legal contract with a publisher is signed, certain property rights are relinquished. The diarist may of course retain the manuscript diary (together with any excised secrets), but the text which goes before the public is available for acquisition. Authorization of the reader is based here on the laws of commercial exchange. The same is true where the diarist is no longer living. Or true up to a paint. For there still exists a commercial contract, but now not with the diarist but with the owners of the copyright. And it may be possible that publication was never sanctioned by the diarist personally. We see here clearly the operation of property rights, that with the death of the diarist authorization of the reader passes along with the property. And though a diarist may have expressly wished the diary not to be published, unless the diarist destroys the diary, there is no guarantee it will never be published. Moreover, with the passage of time, the laws of copyright themselves are revoked and what was once (very) private property becomes fully public. In sum, with the death of the diarist, the prohibition against breaking the secrecy clause gradually diminishes in relation to the diarist's loss of property rights.
But does the prohibition of the secrecy clause diminish altogether? Despite the ease with which I can pick up the published diary of a writer long dead, despite the erosion of property rights, is there not still, to echo Rousset, a trace of inhibition? To be sure, any personal secrets revealed could no longer have an effect on the life of the writer, would no longer be functional. And to be sure, I may have more immediate interests in the diary, such as a comparison of its style with other diaries, or an interest in the social conditions of its time. But the secrecy clause does not guarantee that secrets will be either present or indeed functional; it merely forbids the intrusion of privacy. The fact that we have now been authorized to violate the rule does not prevent the presence of vestigial guilt.
IV
To discuss the effect of publication on the diary, I will begin by mentioning Pepys. Pepys's diary was written between 1660 and 166g, but published only in 1825. This was to a large extent due to the publication of the diary of John Evelyn in 1818, and the early years of the nineteenth century saw the beginning of the practice of publishing diaries. Pepys's diary has greatly conditioned our response to diaries in general and, however erroneously, we still believe that a true diary is not written for publication. The exception, the case of diaries written for publication, proves the rule. Unlike, for example, the novel, the publication of a diary must remain fortuitous. Nevertheless, though our reading of a published diary carries a residual, possibly vicarious, effect of our reading of an unpublished diary, publication alters the status of the work in the same way as it does, say, a novel. This does not mean that it alters the work to the same degree, since though the rights of property still pertain, with the novel there is no secrecy clause separate from those rights. Moreover, there is often a difference with the novel in terms of the time span between the writing and the publication, and the effect of publication on the manUScript diary can be more obvious (despite a reluctance by diary commentators to admit such an effect). What publication of the diary does mean, however, is that the diary can now be subjected to the same types of scrutiny as applied to the novel. Pepys's diary is, for example, scrutinized both as a literary object and as an object of social history.
It may of course be claimed that publication reproduces the original document and thus it is the diary, published or unpublished, that is the object of scrutiny. This is not so. For over and above the common-sense view that if the diary had not been published (or at least authorized for study, which here amounts to the same thing) it could not be scrutinized, there lies a change in the diary as object; and one would only have to ask the diarist (a rare possibility, to be sure) to have this borne out. In what can be considered a parallel case, Jane Gallop analyses the differences in her reading of her own book, Feminism and Psychoanalysis, after it has been published. lO It is not necessary to recount what those differences are, but to look at the reason she gives for them.
Using a Lacanian terminology, Gallop argues that the relationship between a writer and her text is 'imaginary.' In other words, it is an illusion for the writer to hold that it is her conscious intentions which generate and authorize the text's meaning. This is, I would want to add, a necessary illusion to the degree that our notion of selfhood, our belief in the self as a unified and conscious entity, is an illusion necessary for writing to take place. However, when the text enters the public domain it becomes subjected to the 'symbolic' order, where ' the author is one reader among others. ,11 When a text is published, ' its meaning cannot be commanded by the author, but is at large, abroad, in circulation.' In the same way that the self, according to Lacan, when it enters into language, becomes a unit of exchange outside the control of the subject, so the text, when it is published, becomes a unit in an intersubjective network of readings. Publication makes possible a range of interpretations.
It is in this sense, therefore, that a published diary becomes a different text from an unpublished diary. In producing a text no longer the property of the diarist, the publication of diaries has severed the diarist from the diary and introduced a new genre into the market-place of critical discourses. As critics, we no longer need to enter into the illusion of the diarist that a diary is a private communication with oneself, but can subject it to the range of readings we might apply to other genres (though this does not mean, of course, that it will respond in exactly the same way). Indeed, it is often the function of an editor's introduction to offer the most productive approach . And as the number of approaches has increased, so has the range of diaries published, working-class and women's diaries especially. As K.K. Ruthven notes, in a feminist literary history, diaries are likelr to be treated more prominently than epic poems and five-act tragedies. ' In short, the publication of a diary turns the text into literature, a status the notebook cannot achieve since, having not passed into the contractual symbolic order, it remains locked in the imaginary order of the diarist, being accessible only to those unauthorized readers willing to participate in the illusion. This is not to say that all published diaries are literature in the same sense that Pepys 's diary has been heralded as a portrayal of the unchanging essence of humanity. This kind of idealism, depending as it does on the autonomy of selfhood, and grading diaries into the Great and the Minor according to the depth of character revealed, is typical of the age which saw the rise of diary publishing and may even have been one of its causes. But such a view of literature cannot account for the present proliferation of diary publishing (and is a good deal less useful than Roussel's scale). And although Yury Lotrnan, in the article already mentioned, is correct in observing that while the non-literary text is addressed to a real addressee, the addressee in the literary text becomes a formal device, he is incorrect in observing that ' the decisive significance is not the comparatively chance fact of publication but the intention for public use .'13 This would make only those diaries at the far end of Rousset's scale literature. The addressee of literary texts becomes formal not because of the writer's intentions but Simply because the reader is not the real addressee. And a diary becomes literature solely because the work has been published.
v
We have arrived finally atwhat seems a somewhat self-evident fact, that it is perfectly acceptable to read even the most intimate diary proViding it has been published. But the course by which we have come to this conclusion has, I hope, made clearer why this is so. The notebook cannot be read because an ethical injunction prohibits the outsider from breaching the secrecy clause, from breaking into the intimate communication the diarist believes shelhe is having with her/himself. The difference between handwritten and printed texts is a formal indication of this. In the case of the published diary, however, the violation of the text has been carried out under licence, an editor having certified that, either through excision or the passage of time, no harm can be done to living persons. The reader of the published text is thus an authorized reader, authorized not necessarily by the diarist but by a publisher's contract, by a transference of property rights. And because the reader is no longer an addressee, the . reader is free to account for the work in terms different from those of the diarist. The diary has become a different object, a unit of exchange between different discourses, a public text rather than a private document.
But there is one last point worth making. The vicariousness attached to our reading of published diaries attests to some residue left over from the unpublished work. This derives from our being not only readers but also potential writers of diaries. In part, we read published diaries as if they had not been published, as if we were not authorized readers, as if the illusion that it is possible to communicate with an essential self through writing were not an illusion, as if the self were unified and autonomous.
And this as if, constituting, as it were, the idealism of the diary, Rousset's prelapsarian form, may well also constitute our very fascination for reading other people's diaries. 
